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Abstract 
The prior literature on the phenomenon of the Resource Curse includes the theory of the 
Dutch disease, in which the resource exporting sector crowds out other exports through 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate. This paper attempts to add to this literature by 
shedding some light on the existence of this mechanism, exploring the relationship 
between resource booms and the real exchange rate. Using a panel of countries over time, 
I look at the effect of real commodity price indices on countries‟ real effective exchange 
rates, sorting the countries by their resource export-intensiveness. The findings fail to 
support the hypothesis of the Dutch disease, as there is little evidence of a statistically 
significant relationship between a commodity price index change and a real exchange rate 
change. Nonetheless, the findings from this paper should be taken with extreme caution, 
as the regressions are single-factor and non-causal in nature. Further analysis would be 
prudent for those interested in deciphering the extent to which this relationship does or 
does not exist. 
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I. Introduction 
The Dutch disease refers to an appreciation of the real exchange rate resulting from 
increased exports and capital inflows within a country with a booming resource industry.
1
 
This elevated exchange rate feeds back into the rest of the economy and can crowd out 
other exporting sectors. This happened to the Netherlands after a Natural Gas boom in 
1968, prompting The Economist to coin the term “Dutch Disease” in 1977.  
The disease is but one factor within the supposed Resource Curse, the paradox that 
countries endowed with bountiful natural resources tend to grow at much slower rates 
than those without them.
2
 There are multiple hypotheses behind this supposed curse, such 
as a lack of innovation in other sectors (would-be entrepreneurs go into the booming 
resource sector instead), volatile global commodity markets (which cause large swings of 
revenue flows, slowing growth), and weak governmental institutions (which can last 
without reform for longer periods of time due to booming sector revenues). That said, 
while not the topic of this paper, it is worth noting that the Dutch “disease” may not be a 
“disease” at all. It may play out as merely a new equilibrium of an economy given a new 
set of endowed resources, with a drag on growth only occurring with learning-by-doing 
or increasing returns to scale in the shrinking sector (which are foregone over time by 
having more labor and capital go into the booming resource sector instead).
3
 
This apparent paradox is especially interesting today given the increasing global 
nature of the world economy, the rising global prices of many commodities, the various 
policies enacted to manipulate exchange rates, as well as the divergent paths of many 
                                                        
1
 The Dutch disease refers to increased exogenous capital inflows more generally (an influx of 
foreign aid could qualify, for example), but I will only focus on the resource aspect in this paper. 
2
 See Sachs and Warner (1995) for a more comprehensive analysis. 
3
 Krugman (1987). 
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resource-rich countries. Some countries are heavily reliant on resource exports, so these 
nations need to be especially mindful of the Dutch disease, should it exist, as 
deindustrialization of another exporting sector may set in.  
The existence of the Dutch disease in the real world has been tested empirically, to 
a degree. The fluctuating nature of foreign exchange markets can make it difficult to 
parse out any short run trends, and international trade data has only been around for so 
long, limiting the amount of empirical analyses. Much of the focus of other papers has 
been on oil producing countries. There are plenty of reasons for this, such as the 
availability of data, and the reliance on oil of many OPEC nations exceeding that of other 
commodity exporters.  This paper, however, will consider commodity exporting nations 
more broadly.  For example, many metals are highly demanded at the moment, as 
businesses need them for new technological products. Furthermore, some countries, such 
as Chile, export a relatively high amount of copper and other metals, implying that the 
“disease” might just as well occur for them, if it occurs at all. Whether or not metals, or 
any other commodity, can have this effect on real exchange rate appreciation remains to 
be seen. Additionally, the definition of a resource “boom” or being resource-export 
reliant is not a settled one. 
4
 By studying this question, this paper hopes to ascertain 
whether or not certain types of resources lead to Dutch disease effects, and not others. 
Section II discusses the prior relevant literature. Section III reviews theories of the Dutch 
disease and what they imply.  Section IV displays my empirical specification. Section V 
presents my results, and Section VI concludes the thesis. 
                                                        
4 After all, the natural gas rents in the Netherlands that led to the Dutch disease‟s origination only 
amounted to 4.5% of Dutch GDP at their peak in 1984 (and roughly 3.2% at the time of the 1977 
article in The Economist) (World Bank). 
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II. Literature Review 
 Many authors have studied the Dutch disease, both theoretically and empirically. 
Corden (1982, 1984) wrote two prominent early papers. He uses a theoretical model of an 
economy with three sectors: a booming exportable sector (e.g. oil), a non-booming 
tradable sector (e.g. manufacturing), and a non-tradable sector (e.g. services). Given an 
exogenous shock to the booming sector, such as an increase in the global price of that 
commodity, he shows how there is an appreciation of the real exchange rate of that 
economy and a resulting decline in the lagging tradable sector. Corden points out two 
effects leading to this result: the spending effect and the resource movement effect. The 
spending effect refers to the increased level of spending as a result of increased revenue 
brought in by the boom, such as the government receiving higher tax revenues from the 
booming sector, and spending these revenues on the economy as a whole. This increases 
demand and therefore prices and labor in the non-tradable sector (prices for the 
exportable sectors are determined on the global market and not the domestic market), 
shifting labor from the lagging sector to the non-tradable sector. The resource movement 
effect refers to the direct increase in demand for labor in the booming sector; workers 
move from the lagging sector to the booming sector in search of higher wages. This 
pushes up production in the booming sector and decreases it in the lagging sector even 
more.  
 Corden later wrote a paper outlining a specific case of the Dutch disease, namely 
in Australia (2012). He discussed different policy options of the Australian government, 
but noticeably does not do empirical analysis to back his claim of the presence of the 
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Dutch disease in the first place. This gap is important as Australia is sometimes assumed 
to be a case of a mining boom-induced Dutch disease. 
 Other economists have tested this theory empirically, often on a national, one-
country level. For example, Ruehle and Kulkarni (2011) study potential Dutch disease 
effects in Chile following the copper boom in the early 2000s. They find little adverse 
effects in industrial output but slight de-agriculturization, and therefore conclude that the 
Dutch disease did occur. Their study, however, uses basic correlation matrices and single 
factor regression models that notably do not include the real effective exchange rate 
index as a dependent variable, meaning that de-agriculturization may have occurred for a 
host of other reasons (seasonality of agricultural production, for instance).  
 Beine, Bos, and Coulombe (2009) analyze the Dutch disease due to the rise of 
Canada‟s oil production in the 2000s. They implement a Bayesian approach to assess 
how much the Canadian Dollar is associated with commodity prices, and then use that to 
show commodity price changes‟ effects on employment. They conclude that 42 per cent 
of the manufacturing employment loss in Canada between 2002 and 2007 is related to the 
Dutch disease phenomenon. 
 There have been fewer studies looking at multiple countries at once, with the 
exceptions being studies of developing countries and of oil producing nations. Javaid 
(2011), for example, confirms the Dutch disease hypothesis (at least a real exchange rate 
appreciation and a contraction in the tradable sector) resulting from foreign inflows in 
South-East Asian Economies. Others have looked at the effects of oil prices on oil-
exporting nations‟ real exchange rate (Mohammadi and Jahan-Parvar 2010) and industrial 
and agricultural output (Taibnia and Shakeri 2009), finding very limited support in favor 
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of the disease. Lartey (2011) studies the importance of the financial openness of an 
economy for the Dutch disease, using a dataset of 109 countries, but only looking at 
foreign direct investment as the explanatory variable. Sachs and Warner (1995) look at 
the relationship between resource-intensiveness and growth, concluding that economies 
with high resource exports as a percentage of GDP had lower growth rates in the 1970s 
and 80s, after controlling for other relevant factors, but not necessarily due to real 
exchange rate appreciation. 
 Outside the Dutch disease literature, others have looked at the relationship 
between commodity prices and real exchange rates. Cashin, Cespedes, and Sahay (2003) 
examine whether real exchange rates of commodity-exporting countries and the real 
prices of their commodity exports move together over time, finding a relationship for 
about one-third of the countries. They limit their sample to those countries that were 
commodity-dependent over a four year span (58 in total) and use individual commodity 
price indices with monthly data calculated for each country.  
 This paper  expands upon the current literature by looking at the existence of the 
Dutch disease in a broad array of economies, including those that are relatively resource 
reliant and those that are not. Specifically, it will do so by analyzing the shock of a real 
commodity price index on a country‟s real effective exchange rate.   
 
III. Theoretical Framework 
 As mentioned earlier, the seminal model explaining the Dutch disease theory 
comes from Corden and Neary (1982) and Corden (1984). The Core Model discussed has 
three sectors: the Booming Sector (B), the Lagging Sector (L), and the Non-Tradable 
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Sector (N). Corden (1984) describes three events that can provide an impetus for a boom 
in B: technical innovation leading to an increase in output in B (such as the invention of 
fracking), a discovery of new untapped resources, or an exogenous price rise on the 
global market of the booming sector good relative to the price of the country‟s imports. In 
this third case, the booming sector is initially assumed to be entirely exported, or the 
domestic prices are detached from the global market price (as is the case in some oil 
producing countries), which means that it does not have direct domestic inflationary 
pressures. 
 As B booms from one or more of these events, aggregate incomes rise for all of 
the factors initially employed there. Assuming at least part of this extra income is spent 
on non-tradeable goods and services, N, the aforementioned spending effect takes place. 
The price of N relative to the prices of tradables must rise, since N‟s price is set on the 
domestic market the exporting sectors‟ prices are set globally (and are thus stable, except 
for the third case, where PB rises but is not consumed domestically, and so would not 
affect the country‟s price level). This price rise is a real appreciation, and can be defined 
by this equation: 
 REER= NER (P*/P)               (1) 
In (1), REER is the real effective exchange rate, NER is the nominal exchange rate 
between any two countries (specifically home currency unit per foreign currency unit), 
P* is the foreign country‟s price level, and P is the domestic price level. Note that REER 
appreciates even under fixed exchange rate regimes, as domestic inflation outpaces 
foreign inflation due to this spending effect.  
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 In Figure 1, the vertical axis shows Pn, which under the Core Model is the price of 
non-tradeable goods and services relative to that of the lagging exportable sector. The 
demand curve shows demand for non-tradeable goods and services, where income equals 
expenditure at all levels. The spending effect shifts demand from D0 to D1, raising Pn.
 
 In addition, the marginal product of labor increases in B, the booming sector, 
raising demand for labor and thus wages in that sector, which is the resource movement 
effect. This moves labor out of L, the lagging sector, and into B, lowering the lagging 
sector‟s employment and output, which is called direct de-industrialization. Corden notes 
that de-industrialization is merely shorthand, as the lagging sector could just as easily be 
comprised primarily of agriculture, for instance.  Labor also moves from the non-
tradeable sector, N, and into B, decreasing the supply of N and further appreciating the 
real exchange rate. This is shown in Figure 1 by the shift to the left of the supply curve 
from S0 to S1.  The price rise in non-tradeables reinforces the de-industrialization of the 
lagging sector, as it attracts more workers via higher wages to move out of L and into N, 
an exodus Corden calls indirect de-industrialization.  
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 The end result is a weakening in competitiveness in the lagging export sector due 
to exchange rate appreciation and higher wage pressures causing lower output in this 
traditional export sector. This Core Model rests on some simplifying assumptions, 
namely intra-sector labor mobility, and international labor and capital immobility. It also 
assumes the income gain in the booming sector is totally consumed and not invested. 
Relaxing these assumptions tends to mitigate the effects, but not the overall trend of a 
decline in L (Corden 1984). 
 For example, he considers cases where the Booming Sector product is not entirely 
exported, and there is some domestic absorption effect. If the Booming product is a final 
consumption good, its price rise will lead to a positive spending (income) effect driven by 
B‟s owners and workers buying more of everything, a negative spending (income) effect 
driven by people from the other sectors buying less of everything, and a substitution 
effect in which everyone buys less of the booming good and more of the other goods (L 
and N). This would likely lead to real appreciation; the resource movement effect is the 
same. On the other hand, if the booming product is an intermediate good, such as Oil, the 
matter is slightly more complicated. Income in the lagging and non-tradeable sectors 
falls, leading to a negative spending effect. This may or may not cancel out a positive 
spending effect driven by rising income in the booming sector. The resource movement 
effect in this case will be greater, since the marginal product of labor falls in L and N due 
to the higher input price of oil squeezing the values added per unit in those sectors. 
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IV. Empirical Specification 
 Using this Core Model, one can test the Dutch disease hypothesis empirically. 
First, the real exchange rates need to be calculated. Using (1) as a base, CPIs of the given 
countries can act as proxies for the relative price levels, as can GDP deflators. The ratio 
of the different inflation levels merely needs to be multiplied by the spot exchange rate to 
achieve a real exchange rate. The problem with using a bilateral rate, of course, is that it 
not only depends on the country experiencing the boom but the other nation in question; 
very few currencies have remained stable over long periods of time, meaning that the 
effects of the two country‟s currencies need to be separated. This paper will instead use 
the real effective exchange rate index. The REER index represents the ratio of a 
currency‟s period-average exchange rate to a weighted geometric average of exchange 
rates of selected countries weighted by trade amount (this ratio being the nominal 
effective exchange rate). It is adjusted for relative changes in consumer prices, a proxy of 
cost indicators of the home country. This REER data comes from the International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) database from the World Bank, and has data for 93 countries 
dating back to 1967 for Finland.
5
 The Dutch disease hypothesis suggests a positive 
relationship between world resource prices, domestic resource output and the real 
exchange rate. This relationship can be written in a log-linear form as: 
(2)                                                      
                                                        
5 1975 is the starting year for this analysis, primarily due to the lack of data on other 
nations‟ REER until that year. See Appendix B for a description of the statistical 
methodology 
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where REER is the real effective exchange rate, pt represents a commodity price index, 
and    is the error term, with t measured in years.
6
 The Core Model assumes a small open 
economy where resource prices are determined in the global market, thus pt is exogenous. 
 I expand (2) to further consider a country‟s level of resource intensity using the 
following equation: 
(3)                                                                               
 ResourceIntensity is a dummy variable that equals 1 when country i is considered 
relatively resource export-intensive in a given year t.
7
    is the coefficient on the 
interaction term between the commodity price index and the dummy, and thus measures 
the additional effect that a commodity price index would have on the real effective 
exchange rate if the country is exporting a relatively large amount of resources at the 
time. This term is important since theoretically commodity prices might have little to no 
relationship with a country‟s real exchange in general, but could be associated with real 
exchange rate appreciation for those countries who export a significant amount of those 
kinds of resources. Finally, equation (3) is run with ResourceIntensity not representing a 
dummy variable but rather the country‟s resource exports as a percentage of GDP in a 
given year. This version of the regression can deal with some of the potential issues of 
using the dummy variable, namely that it can average out and potentially mask some 
individual effects, and is affected by the choice of intensity threshold chosen. If there is a 
linear relationship between resource exports as a percentage of GDP multiplied by a 
commodity price index and the country‟s real effective exchange rate, it could be shown 
                                                        
6
 Mohommadi and Parvar (2010). 
7
 The cutoff for this measure is discussed later 
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via this regression. Even though this approach will not prove causal effects, showing 
potentially strong correlation is still worthwhile. 
 Real Commodity Price Indices come from the World Bank, which compiles 
weighted indices of energy and non-energy commodity prices.
8
 The non-energy price 
index is split up into agriculture (which includes agricultural raw materials, food, and 
beverage indices), metals & minerals, and fertilizers.
9
 These indices are trade-weighted 
by exports, and are deflated using the Manufactures Unit Value (MUV) index, a proxy 
for the price of developing country imports of manufactures in US dollar terms, used to 
assess cost escalation for imported goods. 2005 is the base year. I looked at annual data in 
order to parse out much of the noise that exists in short-term foreign exchange markets. 
Figure 2 below shows the trends of the indices by resource type over time. While the 
commodity composition of the price indices does not 100% align with the composition of 
resource export type, their make-ups are similar enough to proxy for the relevant index 
for each type. See Appendix A for weights and other details. 
 
                                                        
8
 retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/commodity-price-data) 
9 Fertilizers were not looked at in this paper due to a lack of export data 
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V. Results 
 I first ran a single-factor regression for each individual country over the 36 year 
time frame (1975-2011) per equation (1) above. If the data aligned with the theory, 
one would suppose that there would be no relationship (give or take) between 
commodity prices and real exchange rates for those countries with relatively low 
commodity exports, but a positive relationship for those countries with high resource-
intensiveness. Since each country only has at most 36 data points, and since a 
multitude of different factors affect real exchange rate changes, no one individual 
country regression can lead to a strong conclusion. In the aggregate, though, one 
might think there could be a trend, with high resource-exporting nations having a 
higher coefficient. 
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 In Figures 3a and 3b, the betas from each individual country are graphed against 
the average exports of the relevant resource. While the positive relationship exists for 
Metal exports, the relationship is negative for Energy-related ones. Most of the betas 
were insignificant, however, and looking at the average export value for each nation over 
the time frame masks any resource boom and ensuing bust. The equivalent graphs for raw 
agricultural material and food exports can be seen in Appendix D.  
 In order to average out idiosyncrasies of individual countries, and to take into 
account possible differential effects in different commodity groupings, the countries in 
my sample have been sorted into bins by resource exports as a percentage of GDP in each 
given year (e.g., the top 50% most resource-intensive go in one group, and the bottom 
half the other). This sorting process was repeated to split nations by 2, 3, 5, and 10 groups 
per year; in other words, each country was placed into its relevant half, third, quintile, 
and decile of “resource export-intensiveness” for each year. In addition to sorting based 
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on resource exports as a whole, the process was repeated by type of resource, using 
World Bank World Development Indicator specifications of agricultural raw materials, 
food, fuel, and ores & metals exports (their sum acts as the proxy for each country‟s total 
resource exports). This sorting process also helps control for the varying number of 
countries over the different years of the data set, which dates back to 1975 and goes 
through 2011. The grouping of the countries and the aggregation of resources into one 
variable (resource exports/GDP) helps begin to cancel out other explanatory effects.
10
 
 I then proceeded to run the regression in equation (1) with the dependent 
variable now being the average change in the REER for the countries in each bin. 
When viewing the various results, the hypothesis is that for countries not exporting 
a great deal of resources (so those in the lower-valued bins), there would not be a 
relationship between the commodity price index and the REER, but for high 
resource-exporting countries, such a relationship might exist.  
                                                        
10
 This sorting of countries into groups mimics techniques used in the finance literature, 
in which firms are sorted into groups (portfolios) based on specific characteristics, and 
the returns to the groups (portfolios) of firms are studied. A prominent example is Fama 
and French (1993), in which firms are sorted into categories based on size (market value) 
and value (the book value of their assets relative to market value). Similar methods are 
used in the literature on currency speculation (see, for example, Lustig, Roussanov and 
Verdelhan (2011))  
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Figures 4a and 4b, however, fail to substantiate that claim. While a positive 
relationship can tenuously be seen for energy prices, no such relationship exists for the 
betas on the Nonenergy price index, casting some doubt on the theory. This lack of 
substantial evidence exists when countries are grouped into 2, 3, or 10 bins as well. Since 
the countries‟ resource exports were aggregated, though, it is possible some individual 
boom effects were masked or cancelled out. Additionally, the sorting process takes the 
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average log change of REER for each group of countries within the bin for each year, 
which could bias the findings towards a non-result. Finally, outliers could have skewed 
some of the results due to potentially erroneous reporting of resource exports.  
 Next, I ran regressions of the entire data set using Equation (2) for each resource-
type. I implemented the sorting-methodology to determine the resource intensiveness 
dummy variable. A country had a dummy value of 1 when its resource exports as a 
percentage of GDP fell in the top half, third, fifth, or tenth of all nations‟ resource exports 
as a percentage of GDP for each year. All 92 countries were included in the regression. 
Table 1a: Results of Panel Regression (Impact on Change Ln REER of 
Energy Price Index, Energy Resource Intensiveness dummy, and Price 
Intensiveness interaction term, by country and year) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Change Ln 
REER 
Column I 
Change Ln 
REER 
Column II 
Change Ln 
REER 
Column III 
Change Ln 
REER 
Column IV 
Resource 
Intensity 
Dummy cutoff: 
Energy Exports 
/GDP =Top 
50% 
Energy Exports 
/GDP =Top 
33% 
Energy Exports 
/GDP =Top 
25% 
Energy Exports 
/GDP =Top 
10% 
Change Ln 
Energy Price 
Index 
0.039 
(1.78) 
0.045 
(2.27)* 
0.042 
(2.34)* 
0.060 
(3.09)** 
     
Energy Resource 
Intensity 
Dummy 
0.002 
(0.34) 
-0.002 
(0.37) 
-0.015 
(2.50)* 
-0.015 
(1.88) 
     
Price-Resource 
Dummy 
Interaction 
0.028 
(1.34) 
0.023 
(1.04) 
0.047 
(1.82) 
-0.060 
(1.72) 
     
Constant -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.96) (0.73) (0.22) (0.56) 
 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
N 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 1b: Results of Panel Regression (Impact on Change Ln REER of 
Metals Price Index, Metal Resource Intensiveness dummy, and Price 
Intensiveness interaction term, by country and year) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Change Ln 
REER 
Column I 
Change Ln 
REER 
Column II 
Change Ln 
REER 
Column III 
Change Ln 
REER 
Column IV 
Resource Intensity 
Dummy cutoff: 
Metal Exports 
/GDP =Top 
50% 
Metal Exports 
/GDP =Top 
33% 
Metal Exports 
/GDP =Top 
25% 
Metal Exports 
/GDP =Top 
10% 
Change Ln Metal 
Price Index 
-0.020 
(1.02) 
-0.010 
(0.61) 
-0.003 
(0.22) 
0.007 
(0.48) 
     
Metal Resource 
Intensity 
0.003 
(0.57) 
0.002 
(0.33) 
-0.001 
(0.19) 
-0.006 
(0.69) 
     
Price-Resource 
Interaction 
0.058 
(2.15)* 
0.058 
(2.04)* 
0.067 
(1.94) 
0.029 
(0.62) 
     
Constant -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 (1.00) (0.88) (0.69) (0.61) 
     
R
2
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 In Table 1a, the only significant variable at the 1% level is the price index itself, 
which has a positive relationship with countries‟ REERs with a coefficient of around .05. 
Since these are log differences, I can interpret the coefficient as an elasticity, implying 
that if the energy price index changes by one percent, the real effective exchange rate 
would be expected to change by ~.039-.06%, which is notable for being so small. The 
price-resource intensity interaction term has a positive coefficient but is insignificant. If it 
were significant, an energy price index change would be associated with a higher change 
on REERs for countries experiencing energy resource booms, which would support the 
hypothesis. Moreover, the overall R
2 
values are .01, implying that this model is not a 
good fit and that commodity price indices have very little explanatory power. 
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 The lack of a good fit of the model is not limited to the energy realm. Indeed, 
when looking at minerals and metals, the R
2 
values drop to almost zero, as seen in Table 
1b.  In this case, the metal price index is statistically insignificant, and though the price-
resource intensity interaction term is positive in each case, it is only statistically 
significant when the top half and top third of countries (again, as judged by their metal & 
mineral exports as a percentage of GDP) were considered resource intensive. It should be 
fairly intuitive, though, that a country who relatively exports the 29
th
 most minerals, for 
instance, might not be experiencing a “mineral boom” in the colloquial sense. It follows 
that Columns III and IV of the regression (top fifth and top tenth columns) might better 
fit the theory than the first two versions. Since the coefficient on the price-resource 
intensity dummy interaction term is insignificant in both of those cases, it is fair to fail to 
conclude that the data (at least in this simple model) substantially supports the theory. 
The grouping strategy, though, averages out country-specific variance within each bin. 
This means that countries without a „disease‟ relationship could mask the cases where it 
does occur. Thus, this grouping technique could have biased the results towards a non-
finding. 
 To correct for this potential issue, I substituted resource exports as a percentage of 
GDP for the dummy variable (and in the interaction term). Table 2 presents results for 
this set of panel regressions. The overall results are fairly consistent with the dummy-
variable version. There are few significant variables, with only the energy and 
food/beverage price indices being significant at the 1% level. The only interaction that 
backs up the theory is the metal export one. Fixed Effects results can be seen in Appendix 
E. 
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Table 2: Results of Panel Regression (Impact on change Ln REER of 
change Ln commodity price indices, resource exports/GDP, and 
interaction term using 92 Countries from 1975-2011, random effects) 
 Change Ln REER 
Change Ln Agricultural Raw Material Price Index -0.108 
 (2.26)* 
 
Change Ln Food/Beverage Price Index 0.119 
 (2.87)** 
 
Change Ln Energy Price Index 0.072 
 (3.42)** 
 
Change Ln Metal Price Index -0.042 
 (1.47) 
 
Agricultural Raw Material Exports/GDP 0.022 
 (0.17) 
 
Food/Beverage Exports/GDP -0.033 
 (0.87) 
 
Energy Exports/GDP -0.039 
 (1.71) 
 
Metal Exports/GDP 0.011 
 (0.24) 
 
Agricultural Raw Material Exports-Price Interaction -0.292 
 (0.26) 
 
Food/Beverage Exports-Price Interaction 0.099 
 (0.32) 
 
Energy Exports-Price Interaction 0.014 
 (0.13) 
 
Metal Exports-Price Interaction 0.547 
 (2.11)* 
 
Constant term 0.001 
 (0.18) 
 
R
2
 0.03 
N 2,018 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
  23 
VI. Conclusion 
 While a subset of the data could be interpreted as supportive of the Dutch disease 
theory, the overall findings are generally insignificant and inconclusive. While the 
regressions used in this paper are too simplistic to have causal implications, the lack of 
support for the theory shown by the data should not provide a Dutch disease believer with 
much reason for optimism. While further and more advanced analysis is warranted, the 
results imply that it is at least plausible that no such relationship exists. Nevertheless, one 
should not ignore the shortcomings in this undertaking. Empirical results are subject to 
measurement errors and data limitations. Furthermore, grouping the commodities (rather 
than looking at each specific resource individually) limits possible commodity-specific 
disease findings and could have hidden important idiosyncratic Dutch disease 
phenomena. Nonetheless, according to Corden‟s theory, it should not matter which 
resource is booming, so perhaps that drawback is not as limiting as it may appear. 
Additionally, the omitted variable bias present in this paper would presumably bias the 
results towards displaying a relationship. Since it doesn‟t, more reason exists to not give 
much credence to the theory. Regardless, future analyses looking at potential Dutch 
disease effects should be sure to look at real exchange rate changes and not purely output 
and employment changes, since if the real exchange rate did not change, another theory 
might better explain the phenomenon (should it occur). 
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Appendix A: Commodity Price Index Weights 
 
 
 
Weights Used in the World Bank Commodity Price Index (in Percent) 1/
based on 2002-04 developing countries' export values 2/ and 3/
Share of energy and non-energy indices Share of sub-group indices
Energy 100.0 100.0
Coal 4.7 4.7
Crude Oil 84.6 84.6
Natural Gas 10.8 10.8
Non-energy Commodities
Agriculture 64.9
Food 7/ 40.0
Cereals 11.3 100.0
Rice 3.4 30.2
Wheat 2.8 25.3
Maize  4/ 4.6 40.8
Barley  0.5 3.7
Vegetable Oils and Meals 16.3 100.0
Soybeans 4.0 24.6
Soybean Oil 2.1 13.0
Soybean Meal 4.3 26.3
Palm Oil 4.9 30.2
Coconut Oil 0.5 3.1
Groundnut Oil  5/ 0.5 2.8
Other Food 12.4 100.0
Sugar 3.9 31.5
Bananas 1.9 15.7
Meat, beef 2.7 22.0
Meat, chicken 2.4 19.2
Oranges  6/ 1.4 11.6
Beverages 7/ 8.4 100.0
Coffee 3.8 45.7
Cocoa 3.1 36.9
Tea 1.5 17.4
Agricultural Raw Materials 16.5
Timber 8.6
Hardwood 8.6
Logs 1.9
Sawnwood 6.7
Other Raw Matrials 7.9
Cotton 1.9
Natural Rubber 3.7
Tobacco 2.3
Commodity Type
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Metals and Minerals 31.6 100.0
Aluminum 8.4 26.7
Copper 12.1 38.4
Iron Ore 6.0 18.9
Lead 0.6 1.8
Nickel 2.5 8.1
Tin 0.7 2.1
Zinc 1.3 4.1
Fertilizers 3.6 100.0
Natural Phosphate Rock 0.6 16.9
Phosphate 0.8 21.7
Potassium 0.7 20.1
Nitogenous 1.5 41.3
Notes:
Differences in group totals and components are due to rounding.
1/  Laspeyres Index.
2/ 
3/ 
4/ The maize weight includes sorghum.
5/ The groundnut oil weight includes groundnuts.
6/ The oranges weight includes orange juice.
7/
Trade data sources are United Nations' Comtrade Database via World Bank WITS system, Food and Agriculture Organization 
FAOSTAT Database, International Energy Agency Database, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, World Metal Statistics, World 
Bureau of Metal Statistics and World Bank staff estimates.
Developing countries is represented by Low- and Middle-income Countries (LMIC) as defined by the World Bank Development Data 
Group Classification of Income Group as of June 20, 2006.  
Food and Beverage index combined by weight into nonenergy price index (so Food index received 40/48.4 weight, and Beverage index 
received 8.4/48.4 weight)
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Appendix B: Real Effective Exchange Rate and 
Merchandise Exports Methodology 
 
From the World Bank World Development Indicators Metadata:  
The real effective exchange rate is a nominal effective exchange rate index 
adjusted for relative movements in national price or cost indicators of the 
home country, selected countries, and the euro area. A nominal effective 
exchange rate index is the ratio (expressed on the base 2005 = 100) of an 
index of a currency's period-average exchange rate to a weighted geometric 
average of exchange rates for currencies of selected countries and the euro 
area. For most high-income countries weights are derived from industrial 
country trade in manufactured goods. Data are compiled from the nominal 
effective exchange rate index and a cost indicator of relative normalized unit 
labor costs in manufacturing. For selected other countries the nominal 
effective exchange rate index is based on manufactured goods and primary 
products trade with partner or competitor countries. For these countries the 
real effective exchange rate index is the nominal index adjusted for relative 
changes in consumer prices; an increase represents an appreciation of the 
local currency. 
 
 
Merchandise Exports are recorded as the cost of the goods delivered to the 
frontier of the exporting country for shipment - the free on board (f.o.b.) 
value. Countries may report trade according to the general or special system 
of trade. Under the general system exports comprise outward-moving 
goods that are (a) goods wholly or partly produced in the country; (b) 
foreign goods, neither transformed nor declared for domestic 
consumption in the country, that move outward from customs storage; 
and (c) goods previously included as imports for domestic consumption 
but subsequently exported without transformation. Under the special 
system exports comprise categories a and c. In some compilations categories 
b and c are classified as re-exports. Because of differences in reporting 
practices, data on exports may not be fully comparable across economies. 
Data on exports of goods are derived from the same sources as data on 
imports. In principle, world exports and imports should be identical. 
Similarly, exports from an economy should equal the sum of imports by the 
rest of the world from that economy. But differences in timing and 
definitions result in discrepancies in reported values at all levels. 
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Appendix C: Country Average Resource Exports and Overall 
Data Summary 
 
Country Avg Ln REER Avg Energy Exp. Avg Raw Agric. Mat. Exp. Avg Metal Exp. Avg Food/Bev Exp. Avg Tot Res. Exp.
Algeria 4.46 29.08% 0.17% 0.20% 2.41% 31.86%
Antigua and Barbuda 3.67 0.01% 0.78% 1.21% 3.23% 5.24%
Armenia 4.67 0.61% 0.39% 4.05% 2.23% 7.27%
Australia 4.06 3.10% 1.39% 2.85% 3.38% 10.72%
Austria 3.99 0.70% 0.94% 0.95% 3.18% 5.76%
Bahamas 4.27 58.79% 0.34% 0.70% 2.87% 62.69%
Bahrain 3.89 20.88% 0.14% 22.91% 3.12% 47.05%
Belgium 3.89 4.50% 1.45% 2.47% 6.25% 14.67%
Belize 3.94 1.84% 0.95% 0.16% 21.47% 24.43%
Bolivia 4.01 8.50% 0.35% 5.66% 3.21% 17.72%
Bulgaria 4.55 4.19% 0.88% 5.60% 5.23% 15.90%
Burundi 4.34 0.03% 0.28% 0.30% 4.98% 5.58%
Cameroon 3.70 5.19% 2.69% 1.30% 6.58% 15.76%
Canada 4.09 4.00% 2.16% 1.98% 2.85% 11.00%
Central African Republic 3.74 0.02% 3.08% 4.05% 1.42% 8.58%
Chile 4.04 0.30% 1.81% 12.06% 5.58% 19.75%
China 4.15 0.64% 0.31% 0.64% 2.80% 4.40%
Colombia 4.03 3.67% 0.59% 0.46% 3.63% 8.35%
Costa Rica 3.93 0.20% 1.14% 0.44% 12.80% 14.57%
Cote d'Ivoire 3.69 6.79% 4.64% 0.61% 19.22% 31.26%
Croatia 4.56 2.30% 0.96% 0.71% 2.45% 6.42%
Cyprus 3.94 0.60% 0.23% 0.79% 4.79% 6.42%
Czech Republic 4.66 1.91% 0.93% 1.14% 2.32% 6.29%
Denmark 4.17 1.48% 0.90% 1.47% 6.37% 10.22%
Dominica 4.16 0.00% 0.11% 0.52% 9.29% 9.91%
Dominican Republic 3.68 0.36% 0.43% 0.69% 7.40% 8.88%
Ecuador 3.97 9.36% 0.66% 0.16% 7.15% 17.33%
Equatorial Guinea 3.31 0.00% 0.01% 0.04% 6.90% 6.94%
Fiji 3.74 0.01% 0.79% 0.30% 19.07% 20.17%
Finland 4.44 1.05% 2.54% 0.97% 1.17% 5.72%
France 4.32 0.63% 0.39% 1.58% 2.66% 5.26%
Gabon 3.75 41.79% 5.09% 1.80% 2.07% 50.76%
Gambia 3.86 0.00% 0.66% 0.72% 4.84% 6.22%
Georgia 4.67 0.69% 0.25% 2.21% 3.03% 6.17%
Germany 4.63 0.56% 0.27% 0.71% 1.31% 2.85%
Ghana 4.24 1.80% 1.51% 2.23% 14.23% 19.76%
Greece 3.90 0.83% 0.35% 0.73% 3.75% 5.66%
Grenada 4.27 0.00% 0.03% 0.45% 8.44% 8.92%
Guyana 4.79 0.00% 2.95% 9.88% 35.32% 48.16%
Hungary 3.69 1.51% 1.36% 1.11% 6.15% 10.13%
Iceland 4.09 0.10% 0.20% 4.36% 15.93% 20.59%
Iran 3.97 17.82% 0.11% 0.43% 0.96% 19.32%
Ireland 4.26 0.34% 0.63% 0.60% 9.94% 11.50%
Israel 4.45 0.05% 0.50% 0.38% 2.38% 3.30%
Italy 4.26 0.71% 0.25% 0.43% 2.12% 3.51%
Japan 4.38 0.07% 0.09% 0.30% 0.24% 0.70%
Kiribati 4.69 0.00% 0.31% 0.02% 9.13% 9.46%
Lesotho 4.46 0.04% 1.57% 0.22% 4.13% 5.95%
Luxembourg 4.60 0.27% 0.47% 2.42% 3.10% 6.26%
Macedonia, FYR 4.66 1.35% 0.59% 2.57% 5.56% 10.07%
Malawi 4.22 0.02% 0.68% 1.53% 17.63% 19.86%
Malaysia 4.60 10.16% 6.57% 1.86% 8.58% 27.18%
Malta 4.31 1.19% 0.11% 0.19% 2.83% 4.32%
Mexico 3.88 4.13% 0.26% 0.76% 2.95% 8.10%
Moldova 4.69 0.14% 0.75% 1.30% 20.88% 23.07%
Morocco 3.94 0.42% 0.45% 3.07% 3.94% 7.88%
Netherlands 4.44 6.27% 1.73% 1.33% 9.01% 18.33%
New Zealand 4.18 0.48% 3.66% 0.99% 10.19% 15.33%
Nicaragua 5.52 0.14% 1.03% 0.32% 10.64% 12.13%
Nigeria 4.03 34.26% 0.40% 0.13% 1.16% 35.94%
Norway 4.43 14.90% 0.46% 2.21% 1.91% 19.47%
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Country Avg Ln REER Avg Energy Exp. Avg Raw Agric. Mat. Exp. Avg Metal Exp. Avg Food/Bev Exp. Avg Tot Res. Exp.
Pakistan 3.81 0.43% 0.85% 0.10% 2.67% 4.05%
Papua New Guinea 4.15 6.39% 3.06% 17.55% 12.81% 39.81%
Paraguay 4.26 0.54% 2.72% 0.43% 12.42% 16.12%
Philippines 4.54 0.39% 0.52% 1.48% 4.44% 6.83%
Poland 5.20 0.93% 0.27% 0.86% 1.72% 3.78%
Portugal 4.37 0.61% 0.89% 0.67% 1.91% 4.08%
Romania 4.01 2.01% 0.97% 1.01% 1.59% 5.57%
Russian Federation 4.56 16.35% 0.86% 2.49% 0.52% 20.22%
Saint Kitts and Nevis 4.45 0.00% 0.05% 0.01% 6.39% 6.44%
Saint Lucia 4.51 0.00% 0.11% 0.05% 11.42% 11.58%
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 4.65 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 11.10% 11.16%
Samoa 4.22 0.04% 0.24% 0.72% 3.94% 4.95%
Saudi Arabia 4.00 44.70% 0.32% 0.53% 1.94% 47.49%
Singapore 4.57 23.84% 4.70% 2.35% 6.59% 37.48%
Slovak Republic 4.49 2.65% 0.89% 1.58% 2.12% 7.23%
Solomon Islands 3.99 0.00% 5.36% 0.27% 11.93% 17.56%
South Africa 4.51 2.44% 0.53% 5.75% 2.02% 10.75%
Spain 4.53 0.59% 0.21% 0.39% 2.20% 3.38%
Sweden 4.71 1.14% 1.83% 1.07% 0.88% 4.92%
Switzerland 4.59 0.27% 0.16% 0.84% 0.76% 2.03%
Togo 3.79 0.68% 4.25% 6.35% 5.01% 16.29%
Tonga 4.33 0.00% 0.86% 0.08% 7.21% 8.15%
Trinidad and Tobago 4.65 35.12% 0.03% 0.24% 2.19% 37.58%
Tunisia 4.90 5.87% 0.21% 0.66% 2.88% 9.62%
Uganda 4.49 0.19% 1.90% 0.33% 6.95% 9.37%
Ukraine 4.64 2.73% 0.53% 2.98% 5.30% 11.54%
United Kingdom 4.48 2.02% 0.19% 0.61% 1.26% 4.08%
Uruguay 3.95 0.22% 1.91% 1.45% 6.83% 10.41%
USA 4.53 0.26% 0.24% 0.20% 1.33% 2.03%
Venezuela 4.03 22.76% 0.10% 0.91% 2.12% 25.89%
Zambia 3.79 0.35% 0.90% 22.37% 3.35% 26.98%
Average Max Min Variance Standard Deviation
Year 1995 2011 1975 127.29 11.28
Ln REER 4.70 13.10 3.77 0.25 0.50
Agricultural Raw Material Exports (% GDP) 1.12% 24.10% 0.00% 0.00 0.02
Food and Beverage Exports (% GDP) 5.84% 75.51% 0.00% 0.01 0.07
Metals & Mineral Exports (% GDP) 1.97% 64.34% 0.00% 0.00 0.05
Energy Exports (% GDP) 5.33% 423.16% 0.00% 0.03 0.17
Energy Price Index 68.23 156.26 28.92 1405.35 37.49
Non-Energy Price Index 109.59 171.35 79.05 728.82 27.00
Agricultural Raw Material Price Index 105.55 168.67 79.23 324.81 18.02
Food & Beverage Price Index 126.70 207.06 85.83 1188.25 34.47
Metals & Minerals Price Index 86.21 171.22 53.26 1159.92 34.06
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Appendix D: Graphs of Country-Specific Coefficients on 
Price Indices against Resource Exports 
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Figure 3c: Food and Beverage Price Index Beta vs. Avg 
Food and Beverage Exports/GDP by Country 
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Figure 3d: Agricultural Price Index Beta vs. Avg Raw 
Agricultural Material Exports/GDP by Country 
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Appendix E: Panel Regression Result Tables 
Table 1c: Results, continued (Metal/Mineral Exports Fixed Effect) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Resource Intensity 
Dummy cutoff: 
Metal Exports 
/GDP =Top 
50% 
Metal Exports 
/GDP =Top 
33% 
Metal Exports 
/GDP =Top 
25% 
Metal Exports 
/GDP =Top 
10% 
Change Ln Metal 
Price Index 
-0.021 0.018 -0.070 0.059 
 (0.30) (0.29) (0.92) (1.38) 
Metal Resource 
Intensity 
6.848 5.001 4.102 0.752 
 (4.17)** (5.32)** (7.09)** (5.07)** 
Price-Resource 
Interaction 
0.940 -3.680 1.748 -1.048 
 (0.09) (0.70) (0.52) (1.32) 
_cons -0.041 -0.055 -0.088 -0.035 
 (4.32)** (5.45)** (7.09)** (5.06)** 
R
2
 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 
N 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 1d: Results, continued (Energy Exports Fixed Effect) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Resource Intensity 
Dummy cutoff: 
Energy Exports 
/GDP =Top 
50% 
Energy Exports 
/GDP =Top 
33% 
Energy Exports 
/GDP =Top 
25% 
Energy Exports 
/GDP =Top 
10% 
Change Ln Energy 
Price Index 
0.048 0.052 0.054 0.048 
 (3.08)** (3.88)** (4.43)** (4.23)** 
Energy Resource 
Intensity 
0.003 0.001 0.014 0.010 
 (0.54) (0.12) (1.71) (0.89) 
Price-Resource 
Interaction 
-0.011 -0.028 -0.053 -0.056 
 (0.48) (1.19) (1.93) (1.51) 
Constant -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 
 (1.30) (1.13) (2.15)* (1.68) 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
N 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 1e: Results, cont. (Agricultural Material Exports Fixed Effect) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Resource Intensity 
Dummy cutoff: 
Agricultural 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 50% 
Agricultural 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 33% 
Agricultural 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 25% 
Agricultural 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 10% 
Change Ln 
Agricultural Price 
Index 
0.201 
(1.61) 
0.158 
(1.62) 
0.013 
(0.13) 
0.154 
(2.01)* 
Agricultural 
Material Resource 
Intensity 
-1.740 
(0.66) 
-1.318 
(1.09) 
-1.313 
(2.11)* 
-0.393 
(1.36) 
Price-Resource 
Interaction 
-57.660 
(1.80) 
-20.729 
(1.91) 
-2.772 
(0.43) 
-6.431 
(2.52)* 
Constant 0.005 0.009 0.018 0.007 
 (0.45) (0.84) (1.81) (0.86) 
R
2
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
N 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Table 1f: Results, cont. (Agricultural Material Exports Random Effect) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Resource 
Intensity Dummy 
cutoff: 
Agricultural 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 50% 
Agricultural 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 33% 
Agricultural 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 25% 
Agricultural 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 10% 
Change Ln 
Agricultural Price 
Index 
0.184 
(1.49) 
0.141 
(1.47) 
0.012 
(0.12) 
0.155 
(2.06)* 
Agricultural Raw 
Material Resource 
Intensity 
-2.001 
(0.78) 
-1.558 
(1.33) 
-1.350 
(2.27)* 
-0.429 
(1.55) 
Price-Resource 
Interaction 
-52.164 
(1.64) 
-18.448 
(1.72) 
-2.508 
(0.40) 
-6.400 
(2.54)* 
Constant 0.006 0.011 0.018 0.008 
 (0.56) (1.06) (1.94) (1.02) 
R
2
 .004 . 005 .004 .004 
N 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 1g: Results, continued (Food and Beverage Exports Random Effect) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Resource Intensity 
Dummy cutoff: 
Food/Beverage 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 50% 
Food/Beverage 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 33% 
Food/Beverage 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 25% 
Food/Beverage 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 10% 
Change Ln 
Food/Beverage 
Price Index 
0.138 0.117 0.101 0.104 
 (4.55)** (4.42)** (4.18)** (4.57)** 
Food/Beverage 
Resource Intensity  
-0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.013 
 (0.47) (0.85) (0.53) (1.50) 
Price-Resource 
Interaction 
-0.054 -0.016 0.059 0.094 
 (1.25) (0.35) (1.06) (1.21) 
Constant -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.44) (0.42) (0.78) (0.63) 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
N 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table 1h: Results, continued (Food and Beverage Exports Fixed Effect) 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Change Ln 
REER 
Resource Intensity 
Dummy cutoff: 
Food/Beverage 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 50% 
Food/Beverage 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 33% 
Food/Beverage 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 25% 
Food/Beverage 
Exports/GDP 
=Top 10% 
Change Ln 
Food/Beverage 
Price Index 
0.136 0.114 0.099 0.102 
 (4.38)** (4.22)** (4.01)** (4.41)** 
Food/Beverage 
Resource Intensity 
-0.011 -0.009 -0.000 -0.024 
 (1.17) (0.99) (0.02) (1.71) 
Price-Resource 
Interaction 
-0.058 -0.020 0.047 0.063 
 (1.29) (0.41) (0.82) (0.79) 
Constant 0.003 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.54) (0.11) (0.84) (0.22) 
R
2
 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
N 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 2b: Results of Panel Regression (Change Ln REER on change Ln 
commodity price indices, resource exports/GDP, and interaction term 
using 92 Countries from 1975-2011, fixed effects) 
 Change ln REER 
Change Ln Agricultural Raw Material Price Index -0.113 
 (3.41)** 
Change Ln Food/Beverage Price Index 0.124 
 (4.09)** 
Change Ln  Energy Price Index 0.060 
 (4.20)** 
Change Ln Metal Price Index -0.031 
 (1.67) 
Agricultural Raw Material Exports/GDP 0.020 
 (0.11) 
Food/Beverage Exports/GDP -0.071 
 (0.97) 
Energy Exports/GDP 0.025 
 (0.57) 
Metal Exports/GDP 0.106 
 (1.06) 
Agricultural Raw Material Exports-Price Interaction -0.149 
 (0.13) 
Food/Beverage Exports-Price Interaction 0.017 
 (0.05) 
Energy Exports-Price Interaction -0.024 
 (0.21) 
Metal Exports-Price Interaction 0.501 
 (1.87) 
Constant term -0.002 
 (0.37) 
R
2
 0.03 
N 2,018 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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